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RESPONSE TO TUERKHEIMER –
RAPE ON AND OFF CAMPUS
THE VULNERABLE SUBJECT OF RAPE LAW: RETHINKING
AGENCY AND CONSENT†
Stu Marvel
Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer is one of the most articulate voices in the
U.S. legal academy on the twin issues of sexual violence and rape law reform.
In a series of articles over the past decade, she has laid out many of the deep
tensions surrounding matters of consent and agency,1 the construction of
female sexuality,2 criminal justice in the domestic sphere3 and the role of law
in combating sexual violence.4 Her central voice as a scholar in this area has
also been recognized by the American Law Institute,5 and she is currently a
participant in two major projects involving sexual violence—one aiming to
improve campus policies and procedures involving sexual and gender-based
misconduct,6 and the other to reform the Model Penal Code provisions on
† I remain deeply indebted to Martha Alberston Fineman for the conversations which led to my thinking
on this piece, as well as the broader fellowship of vulnerability scholars at Emory Law School including
Rachel Fenton, Deborah Dinner, Atieno Samandari and Paula Ahumada. An early version of this piece
benefited from discussion at a conference on ‘Sexual and Reproductive Health through a Social Justice Lens’
sponsored by the Emory Reproductive Health Association at the Rollins School of Public Health. I am grateful
to Lasha Clarke and Ruvani Jayaweera for their invitation to speak at this event, as well as to Edison Lim for
assistance and coordination. I would also like to thank the student editors of the Emory Law Journal Online,
most notably Ariel D. Emmanuel and Matthew B. Johnson, for their sharp revisions and careful editorial hand.
 Visiting Assistant Professor, Emory University.
1 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335 (2013),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/sex-without-consent.
2 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461 (2012) (exploring the construction of
notions of female sexuality in jurisprudence).
3 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize
Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 959–62 (2004); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Renewing the
Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An Assessment Three Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (2007); see
also Deborah Tuerkheimer Breakups, 75 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (2013).
4 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1453 (2014).
5 The American Law Institute (ALI), founded in 1923, is the leading independent organization in the
United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and improve the law.
6 Tuerkheimer is an adviser on an ALI project to explore Sexual and Gender-Based Misconduct on
Campus, which will consider a host of issues including reporting procedures; confidentiality; relationships
with police and local criminal justice; interim measures and support for complainants; investigation and
adjudication; the role of lawyers; the creation and maintenance of records; sanctions or remedies; and appeals.
The project will also examine informal resolutions, as well as the nature of hearings. AM. LAW INST., PROJECT
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sexual assault.7 Tuerkheimer’s article for the Emory Law Journal, Rape On
and Off Campus,8 extends her earlier work on sexual agency, consent, and the
inadequate nature of U.S. rape law to examine the disconnect between widely
acknowledged cultural norms around sex, and the stubborn recalcitrance of
rape laws to social reform.9
This response will seek to apply some of the insights of vulnerability
theory to Tuerkheimer’s piece with the goal of extending these important
conversations into new analytical fields. Vulnerability theory is a paradigm
being developed by Professor Martha Fineman and a host of international
scholars associated with the “Vulnerability and Human Condition Initiative” at
Emory Law School, as will be discussed in detail below. The theory provides a
useful vantage upon the systemic and historical patterns of inequality that lead
to violence against women, as well as the legal and social means for redress.
By tracking questions of consent, criminality, and sexual agency through a
vulnerability lens, we may move away from the “vulnerable victim” model to
engage a more robust understanding of resilience and institutional
responsibility.
This response will briefly describe some key elements of Tuerkheimer’s
piece as relates to consent and criminal justice, turn to the language of
“vulnerability” in a sexual assault case she discusses, and then introduce the
vulnerability paradigm as an alternative figuring of the vulnerable subject of
rape law. By applying vulnerability theory to questions of sexual agency and

SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT ON CAMPUS: PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORKS AND ANALYSIS,
https://www.ali.org/projects/show/project-sexual-and-gender-based-misconduct-campus-proceduralframeworks-and-analysis/.
7 Tuerkheimer is a member of the ALI consultative group on a project to re-examine Article 213 of the
Model Penal Code, as concerns Sexual Assault and Related Offenses. Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and
Related Offenses, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-relatedoffenses/#_participants (last visited Mar. 9, 2016). While the Model Penal Code was progressive when
approved by the ALI in 1962, it is now outdated and requires major revisions to remain a useful guide for
legislatures and courts.
8 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1 (2015).
9 Indeed, Tuerkheimer is particularly adept at tracing this type of disconnect between cultural norms and
legal doctrine, as in her piece Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, which explores the manner in which a
culture of growing sex-positivity coexists uneasily alongside the continuing and widespread rape of women by
their friends, dates and acquaintances. Tuerkheimer, supra note 4. She uses the vehicle of “Slutwalks”—a
grassroots initiative that began in Toronto, Canada and that has now become a global movement that embraces
an unabashedly pro-sex mantra—to argue that a social consensus around female agency is now emerging and
ready to push for major reforms to existing rape law. Id. The article does a handy job at balancing social
analysis with calls for legal reform, and is a deft piece of scholarship firmly grounded in contemporary social
developments. Id.
ON
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consent, this response aims to contribute to a vital conversation about legal
reform and societal responsibility in the context of violence against women.
Overview of Rape On and Off Campus
Tuerkheimer’s article is particularly concerned with discrepancies between
the increasing focus on consent (and especially affirmative consent) on college
campuses and university policy, and a continued emphasis on physical force
and resistance in rape statutes.10 Tuerkheimer rightly criticizes the ongoing
presence of statutory force requirements as rooted in archaic notions of both
stranger rape and retrograde notions of female sexuality as consistently willing
and available. In the article, she describes a series of cases wherein the
presence of physical domination did not meet the legal threshold of force, and
therefore was not categorized as rape, despite the sex in question being
profoundly non-consensual.11 Tuerkheimer offers these cases as a vehicle to
ask important questions about the “ambiguous doctrinal treatment of sexual
consent”12 and the role of consent in rape reform efforts—most notably
whether the absence of consent should be adequate to categorize a sexual act as
rape.13
As Tuerkheimer writes, the failure to include a statutory definition of
consent within rape law is “incompatible with prevailing understandings” of
personal autonomy and sexual agency in the contemporary cultural context.14
This new culture of consent is crystallized by not merely the idea that “No
means No,” but by an affirmative mantra of “Yes Means Yes” as an emerging
standard within (especially) college disciplinary codes. This vision of
affirmative choice has sought to define rape not as the presence of aggressive
physical force met by victim resistance, but as all forms of sex occurring
without active consent.15 Given the prevalence of these new cultural norms,
Tuerkheimer advocates for the reformation of rape statutes to more clearly
define consent, while recognizing that rape may also occur without the
10

Tuerkheimer, supra note 8.
Id. at 15–38.
12 Id. at 3.
13 Id. at 4.
14 Id. at 3; see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 2 (discussing the role of the judiciary in interpreting
(especially) female sexuality and sexual conduct).
15 Of course, the growing importance of consent is not evenly distributed across college campuses or
other institutional locations. Nevertheless, Tuerkheimer points to a number of popular media depictions of
female consent, and explains that, “[w]hile by no means universally shared, an understanding of consent as
affirmative is becoming commonplace on campuses.” Tuerkheimer, supra note 8, at 13.
11
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presence of physical force. As she writes, this move would bring rape law into
alignment with contemporary cultural norms around consent;16 focus judicial
perspectives on rape by directing legal review and discouraging speculation as
to whether consent was truly given;17 and ensure that non-consensual sex that
occurs outside of the collegiate world is also subject to culturally appropriate
review.18 Her underlying claim is that “efforts to end sexual assault, on and off
campus, cannot succeed unless consent culture migrates to criminal justice.”19
To illustrate the harms of what she calls “criminal law’s consent problem,”
Tuerkheimer walks through a set of cases involving nonconsensual intercourse
that occurred without the presence of abundant physical force.20 Instead, these
encounters were marked by what she calls “functional force”21—sexual acts
initiated with sleeping, intoxicated or relationally connected individuals against
their will, but unmarked by vigorous physical domination.22 These cases
involve teachers and students, parents and children, friends and acquaintances,
elders and adults, with the defining feature being an absence of physical force
capable of meeting the statutory force requirement.23 While Tuerkheimer’s
focus is on non-forcible sexual violations of women, the cases do range across
male–male sexual encounters as well.24 These cases powerfully illustrate how
reliance upon a physical force model of culpability offers substantial latitude to
defendants to contest the charges of rape.
Tuerkheimer’s argument for the inadequacy of statutory force requirements
is convincingly made, and the cases demonstrate a series of obviously
unwanted sexual acts that nevertheless left the victims unable to seek redress
due to archaic legal formulations of the threshold for rape. Tuerkheimer turns a
steady gaze upon a flawed system with her discussion of these cases, and her
call for a wholesale reform of rape law is certainly overdue. In one of the more
disturbing cases she recounts, State v. Elias,25 the failure of the force
requirement statutes to address non-consensual sex could hardly be more

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 45.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 15–38.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 15–38.
E.g., id. at 19–21 (discussing People v. Tenorio, No. CRA07-002, 2007 WL 4689038 (Guam Dec. 18,

2007)).
25

No. 39139, 2013 WL 3480737 (Idaho Ct. App. July 12, 2013).
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stark.26 In this incident the defendant, Jess Elias, had entered a locked home
where the victim was sleeping with her two young children, and had penetrated
her with his fingers, stopping only when the victim awoke and recoiled in
fear.27 Elias was convicted at trial for forcible penetration by use of a foreign
object, but upon appeal asserted that his conduct was not prohibited by the
sexual assault statute under which he was prosecuted.28 The issue raised on
appeal was not whether the victim had consented—she clearly had not—but
“whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Elias’ conviction through
proof that the act was accomplished against the victim’s will by the use of
force.”29
As Tuerkheimer points out, the Elias case is especially interesting because
the facts allowed the court to “bypass familiar concerns about lying victims
and misguided defendants.”30 Nevertheless, with a statutory definition of
forcible rape in hand, the court ultimately vacated Elias’s conviction as the
circumstances did not involve threats, a weapon, or violent actions—all criteria
necessary to sustain the charge of sexual assault.31
While I agree with Tuerkheimer that the clarity of the facts allows an
avoidance of the he-said, she-said issues of consent that can muddy other
sexual assault cases, there is also an interesting use of the notion of
vulnerability at work as well. The court explicitly described how “Elias used
the unlawful entry while she slept and her vulnerability to accomplish the act
of penetration” against the victim’s will.32 Tuerkheimer also reads the victim’s
unconsciousness as a form of vulnerability—the “vulnerability that sleep
imposes”33—as a way to catalog the varieties of functional force which involve
sleeping victims. Indeed, the court makes full acknowledgement of the fact that
the victim was asleep, and therefore found herself unable to resist Elias’
unwanted advances.34
We are surely accustomed to hearing about victims of sexual violence as
“vulnerable” and thinking of individuals or categories of people as “vulnerable

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

See Tuerkheimer, supra note 8, at 17–19.
Id. at 18 (citing Elias, 2013 WL 3480737, at *1).
Id. (citing Elias, 2013 WL 3480737, at *6–7).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 19.
Id.
Elias, 2013 WL 3480737, at *6 (emphasis added).
Tuerkheimer, supra note 8, at 19.
Elias, 2013 WL 3480737, at *6.
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groups”. We often designate, for example, children, the elderly, sex workers,
or drug addicts as so-called “vulnerable populations” in recognition of their
special precarity or openness to harm. Thus in the Elias case, the victim may
easily be understood as vulnerable not only due to her unconscious state, but
due to a larger cultural narrative about the vulnerability of women to sexual
violence. However, we might pause to consider other vulnerabilities here—and
most critically the vulnerability of Jess Elias. How did the legal system operate
to address his vulnerability at the expense of his victim and her children? In
what ways does the statutory requirement of force respond directly to the
vulnerability of male perpetrators? And how might it advance our
understanding of rape reform to account for these multiple and competing
vulnerabilities?
I would argue that this ruling allowed Elias’s own vulnerability to
prosecution to be mediated by a rape statute which requires force, threats or
weapons to be present. The statutory requirement of force is clearly not crafted
to consider the needs of a sleeping mother who awakes to find her neighbor
making unwanted sexual advances. However it just as clearly served Elias
well, thanks to a narrow definition of force as physical and overpowering
strength. The case thus invites us to think more carefully about the nature of
contemporary rape laws and the historic vulnerabilities they have been
designed to address. In order to understand these competing notions, I will turn
now to the vulnerability paradigm introduced above. This analysis will give us
a structural modality to think through many of the issues that Tuerkheimer
raises, including both the limitations of statutory force requirements and the
affirmative consent culture of college campuses.
Vulnerability Theory
The concept of vulnerability does not describe merely our susceptibility to
harm or danger, but represents a fundamental and universal element of the
human condition.35 As articulated by Fineman, this understanding challenges
the manner in which vulnerability has commonly been applied, most often in
reference to “vulnerable populations” as a specific and negatively stigmatized
subset of society.36 Rather than focusing on the vulnerability of a select few
35

Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 255

(2010).
36 Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal
Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71, 86 (2012) (“The designation of vulnerable (inferior) populations reinforces
and valorizes the ideal liberal subject, who is positioned as the polar opposite of the vulnerable population.

MARVEL GALLEYSFINAL

2016]

4/20/2016 11:36 AM

RESPONSE TO TUERKHEIMER

2041

(and thereby presuming the relative invulnerability of others), the vulnerability
paradigm asks that we expand the frame to recognize our commonly held
vulnerability. We are all vulnerable as embodied beings, and over the course of
our individual lives we will all require the care and support of others.37
This need is most evident when we are infants, and perhaps also as we age
into our elder years or fall ill. These are clear relations of dependency that,
“although episodic, [are] universally experienced.”38 Instead of thinking of
these relations of dependency as aberrations from the autonomy and
independence imagined by the liberal subject of law, however, vulnerability
theory asks us to reimagine the myth of autonomy altogether.39 It requires that
we look not to the rational, independent, self-sufficient liberal subject as the
foundation for our legal and social order, but to the vulnerable materiality of
our human embodiment.40
When the liberal subject is replaced with the vulnerable subject, the
universal relations of care upon which society depends are thrown into relief.
A vulnerability approach allows us to understand our dependency not as a
liability, but as the “compelling impetus for the creation of social relationships
and institutions.”41 Indeed, Fineman argues that it is precisely our universal
vulnerability that has necessitated “the formation of families, communities,
associations, and even political entities and nation-states.”42 The social
institutions we construct are explicitly designed to mitigate human
vulnerability, and to provide (at least some) with resources and support as we
move across the life course.43
Applying a Vulnerability Analysis
This framework gives us a number of conceptual tools to apply to
contemporary rape law. Rather than focus on the “vulnerability” of victims, we
can analyze the body of rape jurisprudence as an institutional system expressly
This liberal subject is thus constructed as invulnerable, or at least differently vulnerable, and represents the
desirable and achievable ideals of autonomy, independence, and self-sufficiency.”).
37 See id.; see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 18 (1999).
38 Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference—The Restrained State, 66 ALA. L. REV. 609, 614
(2015).
39 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004).
40 Fineman, supra note 35.
41 Fineman, supra note 38, at 614.
42 Id.
43 Fineman, supra note 36.
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designed to mitigate certain forms of human vulnerability. It is a structure
created to provide resources and support to some people, while potentially
denying those same mechanisms of support to others. So what vulnerabilities is
rape law actually responding to? As discussed above, Elias’s vulnerability to
prosecution was nicely mitigated by the forcible rape statute. A preoccupation
with force is a longstanding feature of the common law, and one that engineers
rape law as a tool best designed to respond to “stranger rape”—scenarios
where the physical domination of a rape victim is uncontested and consent is
clearly withheld. Yet according to a five-year study conducted by the U.S.
Department of Justice, more than four out of five rapes are committed by
someone known to the victim, with a full 82% of sexual assaults being
perpetrated by a non-stranger.44 The current statutory model of forcible rape
may thus be read as profoundly attuned to the vulnerabilities of sexual
assailants who are acquainted with their victims. The statutes identified by
Tuerkheimer are operating to protect the legal vulnerabilities of known
assailants while denying those same attentions to the vulnerability of their
victims.
Of course, these laws were not consciously crafted for such diabolical ends.
Sexual assault law has merely balanced the vulnerability of men to false
accusations of rape with the vulnerability of women to being raped. However,
this gendered dimension of rape law has long tended to tip in favor of male
vulnerability, which is why the focus has historically rested upon the character
and deportment of the victim—What was she wearing? Has she been sexually
available in the past? Did she fight back against the accused?45 Such a concern
also materializes in the relationship between force and consent, where (as we
have seen) male vulnerability to rape accusations is mitigated by a statutory
requirement for physical violence. Such an evidentiary requirement is a
strategy to protect men from false accusations and is often present in judicial
reasoning around the presence or absence of consent. The role of consent is
critical for Tuerkheimer in this piece, and as she rightly says, “In dicta, judges

44

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION STUDY: 2009–2013 (2014).
There is of course a rich and carefully articulated history of American rape laws, with particular
attention to their specifically gendered nature. My application of the vulnerability paradigm does not intend to
reinvent this work, but it does hope to reveal the competing institutional and structural vulnerabilities at play
within contemporary projects for reform. For far more depth on the history of rape and sexual violence
jurisprudence than can be provided here, see Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality
License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002); Jill Elaine Hasday,
Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359 (1993).
45
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manifest deep skepticism of non-consent in the absence of force. The effect is
a legal presumption of perpetual consent.”46 Such deliberations are difficult to
read if not a concern for the vulnerability of the alleged assailant to rape
accusations, at the expense of the claims made by their victims.47
While these operations of rape law hold a marked gender dimension, they
are just as deeply racialized.48 As Aya Gruber argues, a critical dimension of
rape law has been the historic enforcement of white racial supremacy.49 Thus
the profound vulnerability of black men to accusations of rape by white
women, and the casting of black masculinity as inherently violent and
“bestial.”50 As Gruber explains, it is this figure of racialized male danger
which served as the prototypical rapist—“a black man, lurking in the shadows,
ready to violently assault the presumed-chaste (white) woman.”51 As this
figure of brute and forcible strength composed one side of the rape dyad, so did
the figure of the victim emerge as a virtuous white woman ready to struggle to
the death against an assault upon her virginity. Within this crucible of race and
sex panic were forged our modern statutory force requirements.
Although feminist reformers have been successful at introducing
evidentiary prohibitions (shield laws) and actus reus standards, which
responded to the vulnerability of women to non-stranger rape under nineteenth
century criminal codes, they have been far less successful at shifting the issue
of consent. Tuerkheimer focuses on this issue for the remainder of her piece,
and I hope the issue of consent may most centrally benefit from a vulnerability
analysis.
46

Tuerkheimer, supra note 8, at 16.
In marked contrast to other assault crimes, when it comes to rape the legal system has emphasized not
the actions of the accused, but the victim’s character, behavior, and words. For example, the crime of battery is
established based solely on the perpetrator’s actions and/or intent. The victim’s response to being punched is
irrelevant. A lack of consent is assumed—nobody wants to get punched. Determining a charge of rape, on the
other hand, has been focused not on the action of the assailant, but on the victim’s perceived influence upon
and response to the perpetrator. Rather than examining the actions of the accused to establish the presence of a
crime, as with other forms of assault, the focus shifts to determine whether or not the victim consented or led
on the perpetrator on.
48 Gail Elizabeth Wyatt, The Sociocultural Context of African American and White American Women’s
Rape, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 77, 79–80 (1992).
49 Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 587 (2009). Gruber
argues that rape law also served two other interlocking goals: it was part of the larger state effort to police
sexuality in general, and it sought to entrench male domination over women through chastity and ownership
paradigms. Id.
50 N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2004) (analyzing construction of Black men as sexual “beasts”).
51 Gruber, supra note 49, at 587.
47
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Consent and Vulnerability
Tuerkheimer recognizes that neither statutory rape law nor the collegiate
response to on-campus rape has been able to adequately respond to the
prevalence of non-stranger sexual assault. She acknowledges that colleges
have faced a “massive institutional breakdown” in responding to sexual assault
that encompasses many factors,52 but (at least for this article) focuses her
analysis primarily on the failure to adequately define sexual consent. Her
argument is that even as we move to reshape the institutional response to
sexual assault, “the necessity of consent is the premise that frames the
discussion.”53 We may then ask, What changes when we add a need for
affirmative consent? What does that shift in the relationship between the
actors, their social relationships, and the unequal distributions of power that
may be in play? To begin answering these questions it may be helpful to return
to some of Tuerkheimer’s examples and the social relationships between the
litigants in a number of the cases she discusses.
As mentioned above, the vulnerability analysis is directly concerned with
relationships of care and dependency. It is also focused on the embedded
nature of those relationships within our key social institutions—the
relationship of a teacher and student within a school; a parent and child within
a family; an employer and employee within a workplace; an elderly person and
a young adult within the home. Many of Tuerkheimer’s examples focus on just
these sorts of relationships, which carry an inherent power imbalance due to
their dependent nature. As part of her development of the categories of
“functional force” Tuerkheimer dubs these interactions as ones of “relational
control” where “the victim’s ongoing relationship with the defendant” means
that physical force is not necessary to coerce non-consensual sex.54 These are
paradigmatic relations of dependency, and it is true that the responsible party
in each instance abused their position in order to initiate unwanted sexual
contact.
However, in many of these cases, and particularly those involving children
and youth, the issue of consent appears to miss the point. We indeed desire
spaces free of sexual exploitation as a society, and this is why we have both
laws and taboos around incest and underage sexual contact. Consent puts
undue attention upon the individual, however, when in fact it is the relationship
52
53
54

Tuerkheimer, supra note 8, at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 30.
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of child/parent, student/teacher itself that requires protection. It is the
structural relationship of dependency and care that matters, which is why (for
example) many educational institutions have policies prohibiting sexual
contact between undergraduate students and faculty, regardless of the age of
the student or the presence of consent. It is the relationship of teacher/student
that is important to the integrity of the school, not the individual consent (or
otherwise) of the parties. Such policies recognize that exploitation is inherent
to certain relationships and limits must be placed upon them for the greater
social good.
Also important to focus on is the question of responsibility. In the examples
of student/teacher and parent/child, there are different levels of responsibility
and capacity inherent within each relationship. While the child certainly has a
role to play in this regard, the parent carries the overwhelming burden of
responsibility. These are not intended to be equal relationships between
autonomous individuals but are inherently uneven in terms of the distribution
of power. For its part, the state must also shoulder responsibility in creating the
laws and social institutions that will prevent conditions of exploitation from
occurring. Thus, responsibility again is not about the characteristics of the
individual, but the context in which each social relationship occurs. Under the
consent model, responsibility falls upon each individual within a he-said, shesaid scenario that masks both institutional context and social relationships.
Rather than continuing to focus on individual actors, a vulnerability analysis
would broaden the frame to share responsibility within the context of the
institutional setting while also taking into account the nature of their social
relationship and its inherent dependencies.
While I applaud Tuerkheimer for seeking to recognize the forms of
“relational control” that may inhere within such social dynamics—and this is
important work—her sole focus in this regard remains on the presence of fear
and trust.55 Indeed, as she argues, “In the context of non-stranger rape, trust
imposes vulnerability.”56 While I appreciate that we are using the term in
different registers, I would argue that vulnerability is produced not by trust in
55

Id.
Id. at 33. In fact, I found this section to be more tenuous than the carefully constructed arguments
around sleep and intoxication. I am simply not convinced by Tuerkheimer’s claim that it was the victim’s
“trust” that allowed the perpetrator to foist unwanted sex upon her. As she writes, “Carlson was able to achieve
sex without [the victim’s] consent, and without using force, because she trusted Carlson to respect her
expressed desires.” Id. at 34. This passage feels overly speculative and unnecessary. A range of social
pressures and motivations may come into play during such intimate relationality, and there does not seem a
need to impute the victim’s ‘trusting’ mindset except to fit the bounds of Tuerkheimer’s own taxonomy.
56
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human relationships but by the failure of our laws and institutions to
adequately recognize and mitigate the inherent power imbalances within those
relationships. Where power is distributed unequally, we require robust
guidelines and frameworks to stop exploitation from occurring. Again, this is
not merely a question of individual consent and personal autonomy; rather, it
involves awareness of the institutional context and shared responsibility across
multiple and often dependent actors.
Consent and Criminality
Where I find Tuerkheimer’s argument for consent most compelling is in
regard to the need for a statutory definition of consent, specifically in order to
prevent the judiciary from speculating at any rate about its presence or
absence.57 As she argues, without a statutory definition it becomes easier for
“unfettered judicial preconceptions about the significance of passivity” to
emerge.58 I think this is correct, and I am sympathetic with Tuerkheimer’s
frustration at the necessary link between force and rape, as well as its tension
with the culture of consent that is slowly emerging. However, it is not always
clear from her text why incidents of sexual violence must be captured under
expanded criminal rape statutes.
For example, while the model of collegiate affirmative consent is held up
as a superior vision, the article does not contrast criminal rape proceedings
with what she refers to as the “sub-criminal”59 reviews of non-consensual
sexual intercourse which occur on college campuses. Yet the reader is led to
the conclusion that such tribunals are more effective, because they engage a
more capacious understanding of (especially) affirmative consent, and
presumably offer more protection for the survivors of sexual assault.60
Nevertheless, given that other provisions are available and the range of
scenarios and relationships presented may warrant a mobile range of laws and
prosecutions, it is not always clear why criminal rape proceedings are viewed
as the ideal response.

57

See id. at 3.
Id. at 38.
59 Id. at 5, 39.
60 Tuerkheimer mentions that the “prevalence of sexual violence against undergraduate men, as
compared to women, is even less understood.” Id. at 6 n.29. This is not a tremendously comforting reflection,
given that the consent model is being advanced here as the correct location for legal reform. Id. In the same
footnote, she cites a piece by Dana Goldstein, The Dueling Data on Campus Rape, which describes the
difficulties in locating accurate statistics on sexual violence among college populations. Id.
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What should be the relationship between the degree of injury and the
punishment of the offender? This appears to be Tuerkheimer’s underlying
question, although it is never addressed as such. If a sexual offender is not
convicted on the most serious charges because force was not found to be
present, but was nevertheless subjected to criminal penalty, what then becomes
the issue? Is it symbolic? Consequential? Tuerkheimer never explains why the
more serious charges should be championed. At least in regard to some
varieties of sexual assault, she explains that “nonconsensual sex with
extremely intoxicated victims can be punished in many jurisdictions under
separate statutory provisions.”61 More information is required as to why “the
classification of rape as a sub-criminal offense” is such a problem.62
Sexual Agency
Ultimately, Tuerkheimer locates her solution to antiquated rape statutes in
sexual agency. “Unlike the traditional autonomous self, who can operate
largely free of external influences, the agentic subject experiences substantial
constraints. Yet within those constraints, the agentic subject is capable of
exerting a will.”63 She is arguing here against positions like that taken up by
Jed Rubenfield, who “posits that rape implicates a right of physical selfpossession, which means that force sufficient to ‘dispossess’ a woman of her
body is required for sex to be rape.”64 This is a classical view of the liberal
subject built upon expressly gendered foundations. As the liberal subject is a
self-possessed and sovereign subject, rape then becomes the dispossession of
that bodily autonomy. We are both in disagreement with Rubenfield’s position,
but Tuerkheimer’s move is to agency instead of autonomy. This is more
relational in orientation, but I am concerned that it still does not yet move far
enough from particularized notions of the self.
The vulnerable subject of rape law would not rest upon individualized
claims made by a rational self-willed actor. Rather than focusing on the
‘vulnerable’ victim/agent, or even upon the vulnerability of the
perpetrator/criminal, a vulnerability analysis asks that we consider questions of
responsibility and power as embedded within an institutional matrix.
Autonomy and agency do not simply arise; they emerge from our ability to
build resilience over the life-course. They are also rooted in our relations of
61
62
63
64

Id. at 25.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 17 n.84.
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dependency and cannot be decontextualized from the moment of harm. A
focus on consent and agency is too narrow to account for the responsibilities
held by each individual within our social relationships, particularly when such
relationships are loaded with unequal distributions of dependency and care.
Nor does a focus on consent and agency easily allow us to account for the
responsibility to be attached to our social institutions as well.
To that end, I agree with Tuerkheimer that an important phenomenon has
been emerging from college campuses in recent years as students and
administrators are beginning to genuinely address the widespread incidence of
non-stranger rape. Tuerkheimer describes the White House’s recent initiatives
in this area, including a one-minute public service announcement devoted to
non-stranger rape which features President Obama alongside celebrities such
as Daniel Craig, Benicio del Toro and Steve Carell. As Tuerkheimer explains,
At the outset, del Toro declares, “if she doesn’t consent, or if she
can’t consent, it’s rape.” The rest of the spot functions as a call to
action: speak up, help her, do not blame her, do not be a part of the
65
problem, be a part of the solution.

She also points approvingly to affirmative consent definitions being
enshrined in campus disciplinary codes, which “construct sexuality to
underscore its agentic qualities.”66 While her piece as a whole is aimed at
pointing out the gap between such evolving cultural norms and the recalcitrant
nature of statutory rape law—and it by no means lauds the collegiate model as
an easy fix—she does note that college students have access to institutional
support unavailable to the general population. As Tuerkheimer explains,
[T]he discrepancy between competing rape definitions functions to
discount the non-forcible sexual violations of women (and men) who
are not presently attending college—as it happens, women who are
even more vulnerable to these violations than their undergraduate
counterparts. For victims living in jurisdictions that maintain a force
requirement, unless they attend college, there is no resort to an
alternate (albeit sub-criminal) definition of rape as sex without
67
consent.

I would argue, however, that the most critical divergence between
collegiate sexual assault provisions and jurisdictions with statutory force

65
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67

Id. at 8.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 5.
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requirements is not the “emerging culture of consent”68 that Tuerkheimer
identifies. Rather, it is the presence of a culture of institutional responsibility
on the part of the university. This is why non-collegiate people are less
resilient: because the only institution they can look to is a criminal justice
system with an antiquated notion of force that remains entrenched upon
profoundly racist and gendered roots. Consent may be one manifestation of
that divergence, but it is not the distinguishing factor. The real difference
between college sexual assault policies and criminal rape law is that the former
have begun to take responsibility for the vulnerability of students, albeit in
haphazard fashion, even as universities seek to ameliorate their own
institutional vulnerability to Title IX violations. Consent may thus be
understood as a factor in pushing forward campus protocols, but as part of a
larger apparatus of collegiate sexual assault reform. The inclusion of
affirmative consent policies is part of this institutional shift, but the reason that
collegiate women enjoy greater protections is not because of consent per se,
but because an institutional culture is slowly developing to take responsibility
for the vulnerability of students to sexual assault.
Ultimately, the language of vulnerability is often used to describe victims
of rape in ways that are not entirely productive. This response piece has aimed
to recalibrate that language and demonstrate the generative nature of
vulnerability as well as the analytical frames that a vulnerability analysis may
open when we seek to consider the vulnerable subject of rape law. Such a
conceptual reframing helps us move from designating individuals as vulnerable
victims of violence, toward recognizing that one’s susceptibility to sexual
violence emerges from an intersecting array of factors that include a lack of
individual resources, legislative and judicial failures, and the limitations of
institutional support. The focus then becomes not one of agency and consent,
but of social relationships and institutional context. This helps us to see past
criminal justice as the central mode for response to sexual violence, while
placing an impetus of responsibility upon all actors—individual, institutional,
and state—to address the conditions of possibility for sexual exploitation.

68

Id. at 45.

